Introduction
H Models in which informed managers attempt to signal private information to the capital market have been used to explain a wide variety of corporate financial behavior, including capital-structure decisions (Ross, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984) , dividend policy (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985) , and management share ownership (Leland and Pyle, 1977) . The appeal of these models is that they account for corporate financial behavior that is otherwise difficult to rationalize, and they are based on the reasonable assumption that a manager has private information about the firm's performance.
These models, like most in the finance literature, abstract from the other markets in which the firm operates. Yet, when a firm reveals information to the capital market, it often does so by a publicly observable action (such as a dividend) that reveals information to otherwise uninformed agents in other markets (such as product-market rivals). These agents then condition their behavior on this information, and this affects the profit (gross of financing costs) of the informed firm. When the informed firm's gross profit is endogenously deter-mined in this way, product-market considerations affect the informed firm's decision to reveal information through its financial policy.
This payoff endogeneity is important; it is the crucial determinant of equilibrium in our model. It is also a second dimension (in addition to asymmetric information) on which the model departs from the Modigliani-Miller framework: financing costs and gross profits are endogenously determined by financial policy.
We capture these ideas by developing a two-audience signalling model: the informed firm signals to two uninformed audiences, the capital market and the product market. Although such two-audience signalling models have received little attention in the literature, a rich collection of potential applications exists. We discuss some of these in the Conclusion.
Our main result is that the reasonable capital-market equilibria (i.e., those that satisfy a refinement) maximize the ex ante expectation of the informed firm's endogenous gross product-market profits. In this sense the character of capital-market equilibrium is determined by the structure of the product market. Thus, it may be misleading to analyze the firm's financial side separately from its real side.
An immediate corollary of our main result is that (generically) either all the reasonable equilibria are separating or all the reasonable equilibria are pooling. Indeed, the latter is often the case. This is in distinct contrast to earlier work on the information content of financial structure and to more recent work on refinement in signalling games, both of which focus on separating equilibria. Our result shows that such full disclosure need not be (reasonable) equilibrium behavior.
To emphasize the effects that arise with the introduction of the product market, Section 2 presents an extremely simple one-audience signalling model of financial policy when there is asymmetric information about the issuing firm's exogenous gross payoffs. This model is in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) , who make the fundamental point that a firm's preference for debt over equity increases as the firm's profit increases, because the financing cost of an equity issue increases with the firm's profit. This motivates a negative inference about firm value when a firm issues equity. This inference is consistent with the empirical finding that share prices decrease after the announcement of an equity issue; see, for example, Asquith and Mullins (1986) . In the simple model in Section 2 we show that capital-market equilibrium can be either separating or pooling: in the separating equilibria the low-profit firm issues more equity and the high-profit firm issues more debt; in the pooling equilibrium both types of firm issue only debt.
In Section 3 we present a general model of product-market competition under asymmetric information. This describes the relationship between the informed firm and the second audience. We then offer two examples that differ in one crucial respect. In each example there are two firms that play a Cournot game under asymmetric information: the issuing firm (firm A) knows the level of demand; its rival (firm B ) does not know the level of demand, but observes firm A's transaction with the capital market. In the first example the rival is an extant firm in the industry; in the second the rival is a potential entrant. The crucial difference between the models is as follows. In the first the ex ante expected profit to firm A is greater when its capital-market transaction reveals nothing about demand (i.e., when capital-market equilibrium is pooling) than when its transaction reveals demand perfectly (i.e., when capital-market equilibrium is separating). In the second example the opposite is true.
Section 4 integrates the two relationships described in Sections 2 and 3. We explain the timing and information structure of our game, and define the refinement we impose. In Section 5 we prove our main result and state some additional characterization results. Our main result is that the form of capital-market equilibrium (i.e., whether this equilibrium is pooling or separating) maximizes the ex ante expected product-market profit to firm A. If ex ante expected product-market profit to firm A is higher when firm B is uninformed, capital-market equilibrium is pooling: firm A's choice of capital structure reveals no information. If ex ante expected product-market profit to firm A is higher when firm B is informed, capital-market equilibrium is separating: firm A's choice of capital structure perfectly reveals its private information.
This result is in stark contrast to the results in models with exogenous payoffs: without product-market concerns, equilibrium can be pooling or separating (as shown in Section 2), whereas in our model the product market determines which form of equilibrium prevails. In addition, given a very mild regularity condition, we show that in any reasonable pooling equilibrium, if one type of the informed firm has higher gross profit when capitalmarket equilibrium is pooling than when it is separating, then that type must also have higher financing costs when capital-market equilibrium is pooling than when it is separating. An immediate corollary of this result is that there cannot exist a pooling equilibrium in which the firm issues only debt. This contrasts with the result in Section 2 that states that only debt is issued in a pooling equilibrium. The result also differs from Myers and Majluf (1984) and Gertner (1986) , who use models that abstract from product-market effects to show that only debt is issued in a pooling equilibrium.
We conclude this Introduction by discussing some related work. Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) also consider the informational links between the product and capital markets. They analyze a model in which a firm needs to raise capital for an R&D project. Information revealed to the capital market about the firm's technology is observed by the firm's uninformed rivals. Bhattacharya and Ritter show that there exists a separating equilibrium in which the better the firm's technology, the more of its technology it chooses to reveal.
There are several differences between Bhattacharya and Ritter's (1983) analysis and ours. First, we focus on an indirect mechanism (namely, capital structure) by which information is revealed, whereas they consider direct (and verifiable) information revelation. Second, they demonstrate that a particular separating equilibrium exists, while in our model pooling equilibria not only exist but may be more reasonable than any separating equilibrium. Finally, our model is closer in spirit to the asymmetric-information models used in the finance literature, and this enables us to identify the changes in equilibrium financial structure that occur when product-markets effects are included. Glazer and Israel (1987) also consider the effect of financial signalling on productmarket competition. They show that the choice among alternative compensation schemes by an informed manager of an incumbent monopolist can affect the entry decision of a potential competitor. In their model, however, the incumbent's shareholders contract with the manager before the manager becomes informed, so that the subsequent game between the manager and the potential competitor is a standard one-audience signalling problem.
A few other papers study the interplay between the product and capital markets. Bolton and Scharfstein (1988) analyze the product-market effects of moral-hazard problems in the capital market. In particular, they show that such capital-market imperfections can provide a rigorous rationale for the long-purse theory of predation. Their emphasis on moral hazard contrasts with our focus on adverse selection. Allen (1986) , Brander and Lewis (1986), and Maksimovic (1986) consider models in which a firm's capital structure affects its probability of bankruptcy, and therefore also its strategic incentives in the product market. There is no information transmission in these models, however, because they assume complete information.
Signalling to only the capital market
This section presents a signalling model of capital structure in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) . Consider a firm (or entrepreneur) that needs to raise $ K to undertake a project. The gross profit from the project, .rr, is either .rrH or .rrL, where irH> irL;we refer to the firm's gross profit as its "type." The firm knows how profitable the project will be, but potential creditors do not.' Our analysis is independent of the number of potential creditors; hence, we assume that only one exists. Ex ante, this creditor believes that the return will be TH with probability 6 E (0, 1). Ex post, realized profits are observable and verifiable by all parties, so that financing contracts can be contingent on T. We consider the following two-stage game between the firm and the creditor. In the first stage the firm offers a financing contract involving debt or equity or both. In particular, a contract (a, D) E R2 means that the firm pays the creditor min { D + a (-D), ir} when profit is T. This payment function reflects our assumption that the entrepreneur is protected by limited liability: the firm can never be forced to pay creditors more than T. We interpret D as a debt payment and a as equity participation, although we simplify our analysis greatly by not requiring D 2 0 or a E [0, 11. This is equivalent to assuming that any linear contract between the firm and the creditor is feasible. In this two-type model an arbitrary financing contract can be represented by a linear contract: all that is relevant are the two payments made by the two types of firm. Thus, in this simple setting we can restrict attention to linear contracts without loss of generality.
In the second stage of the game, given a financing contract offered in the first stage, the creditor chooses whether to accept or to reject it. If the creditor accepts the contract, then the firm invests in the project and its profit is distributed according to the terms of the contract. If the creditor rejects the contract, the game ends and the payoffs to both the firm and the creditor are zero.
The creditor is risk neutral and can earn an expected rate of return r elsewhere. Therefore, the creditor makes nonnegative expected profit from the contract ( a , D ) if
where the expectation is taken with respect to the creditor's belief about the firm's profit, TH or TL. The firm's payoff if the contract ( a , D ) is accepted is max ((1 -a ) ( r -D), 0 ) ; this payoff is deterministic because the firm knows the value of T. To keep things simple, we assume that gross profits are sufficient to avoid bankruptcy: irH > i r> R .
In this game a (pure) strategy for the firm is a function from its type space, {TH, TL), into the contract space, [R2. A (pure) strategy for the creditor is a function from the contract space, R2, into an acceptance decision in (0, 1 ) .We also need to define the belief held by the creditor after observing the contract (a, D ) offered by the firm: let p(a, D) be the creditor's assessment of the probability that ir = TH.A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this game is a pair of strategies and a belief function satisfying two conditions. Condition I . (i) Given its type and given the creditor's strategy, the firm's strategy maximizes its expected payoff. (ii) Given a contract offered by the firm, (a, D), and given the creditor's belief, p(a, D), the creditor's strategy maximizes its expected payoff.
Condition 2.
When possible, the belief p(a, D ) is derived from Bayes' rule and the firm's strategy.
In terms of the existing literature, this is a signalling game, as introduced by Spence (1 973). It is straightforward to show that the following pure-strategy pooling and separating equilibria exist. (In what follows we ignore mixed strategies.) A l l of these equilibria correspond to intuitions developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) .
First, there is a unique pooling equilibrium in which both types of firm offer the debt contract (0, R). This equilibrium is suppo1-ted by the following beliefs off the equilibrium path: if the creditor observes the deviation (a', D'), its belief p(a', D') is zero if a' 2 0 and ' We use the term "creditor" for any agent who finances the firm's project, regardless of whether the financing involves debt or equity.
one if a' < 0. These beliefs imply that, for any deviation (a', Dl), either the creditor rejects the contract or neither type of firm has a strict incentive to offer it.
To see that no other pooling equilibria exist, suppose that (a, D) were a pooling contract, where a # 0. Any pooling equilibrium must involve nonnegative expected profit for the creditor:
For a # 0, at least one type of firm pays a financing cost strictly greater than R. This type can offer the deviation (0, R), which the creditor accepts for any belief p. The same deviation breaks a putative pooling equilibrium at (0, D), where D > R. Thus, (0, R) is the unique pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium contract. This equilibrium formalizes part of the intuition behind Myers and Majluf's (1984) observation that issuing firms prefer debt to equity.
Second, there exists a continuum of (essentially equivalent) separating equilibria. In a separating equilibrium the high-profit firm offers the contract (aH, DH) and the low-profit firm offers the (different) contract (aL, DL). Because each type of firm could offer the other's contract, the following incentive-compatibility constraints must hold:
(The argument following equation (5) in Section 5 shows that limited-liability constraints are not an issue here.) Adding these two inequalities yields aL2 aH, and we can rule out aL= aHbecause the incentive-compatibility constraints then imply that DL = DH, which is pooling. Thus, aL> aH: in a separating equilibrium the low-profit firm issues more equity than does the high-profit firm. This follows directly from Myers and Majluf's (1984) observation that equity financing costs increase with gross profit.
A separating equilibrium also must guarantee the creditor nonnegative expected profit. In fact, the creditor earns zero profit on each contract: as above, if a single type of firm pays a total financing cost greater than R , then it would offer (0, R ) , which is always accepted. The creditor's zero-profit constraints are:
Solving these equations for DH and DL and substituting into the incentive-compatibility constraints yield a simple pair of inequalities: aL2 0 2 a H These inequalities and the creditor's zero-profit constraints completely characterize the continuum of separating equilibria. These equilibria are supported by the out-of-equilibrium beliefs described for the pooling equilibrium: p(al, D') = 0 if a' 2 0, and p(al, D') = 1 if a' < 0.
Note that these separating equilibria are essentially equivalent in that the creditor and both types of firm are indifferent among them. Myers and Majluf (1984) identify perhaps the most natural sf these equilibria: (aH, DH) = (0, R ) and (aL, DL) = ( r L / R , 0), SO that the high-profit firm issues debt and the low-profit firm equity.
As is well known, it is common for signalling games to have a plethora of perfect Bayesian equilibria; as we have just shown, our model is no exception. In some models many of these equilibria are supported by unreasonable beliefs off the equilibrium path. Several recent articles propose stronger definitions of equilibrium that restrict these out-ofequilibrium beliefs. Cho and Kreps (1 987 ), for instance, propose a refinement that isolates a unique equilibrium in Spence's (1 973) original education-signalling setting. As we discuss in the conclusion, however, Cho and Kreps' refinement has considerably less power in our model.
In this article we adopt a stronger refinement based on the definition of neologismproof equilibrium developed by Farrell(1983) and the definition of perfect sequential equilibrium developed by Grossman and Perry (1 986). The refinement involves what we call a consistent interpretation of a deviation from a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Formally, an interpretation of a deviation is a (nonempty) subset of the type space: the creditor observes the deviation and hypothesizes that some member of the specified subset is responsible for the deviation. In this two-type model the only possible interpretations are { r L ) , { r H ) , and { r L , r H ) . Given an interpretation, the creditor's posterior belief is its prior belief renormalized over the specified subset. Given a posterior belief, sequential rationality determines whether the creditor accepts or rejects the deviation; if the creditor is indifferent, we assume that the deviation is accepted. Thus, given an interpretation of a deviation, each type in the type space can compute its payoff from offering the deviation and can compare this with its payoff in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in question. A consistent interpretation is a fixed point of the map described above: a type strictly prefers its payoff from offering the deviation to its equilibrium payoff if and only if it is a member of the hypothesized subset of the type space.
We argue that if a deviation has a consistent interpretation, then it is natural for the creditor to hold the associated posterior belief. By construction, this belief motivates an acceptance decision that induces some types to deviate, thereby destroying the equilibrium in question. We therefore strengthen our definition of equilibrium to require the following.
Condition 3. There cannot exist a deviation with a consistent interpretation.
We call an equilibrium that satisfies Conditions 1-3 a Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium.
It is interesting that all the perfect Bayesian equilibria identified above are FarrellGrossman-Perry equilibria. (The proof is simple and unenlightening, so that we omit it.) This result holds because the beliefs we use to support these equilibria are reasonable in the following sense. A deviation (a', D') with a' > 0 is more attractive to the rL-type than to the rH-type. This suggests that when a' > 0, the creditor's belief should put more weight on rLthan on r H , as is the case (in the extreme) in our equilibria. The analogous intuition applies when a' < 0.
Product-market competition under asymmetric information
In this section we model the product market and thereby endogenize the gross profits taken as exogenous in the previous section. We first present a general model of productmarket competition under asymmetric information. Then we describe two simple examples that differ in a way that is the key to our results.
Let r ( q , t) be the profit to firm A when its type is t E {i,t ) and it is common knowledge that firm B believes that the probability that t = 7 is q E [0,11. Since we use r ( q , t) to determine payoffs off the equilibrium path, it is important not to interpret q as the commonknowledge probability that nature draws t = ? for firm A: firm B's belief could be wrong. This general model is deliberately vague about the game between firm A and firm B that generates these profits. This allows our single formulation to cover a broad collection of specific models, including those characterized as "strategic substitutes" and "strategic complements" by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1 985). The single assumption on r ( q , t) that we maintain throughout our analysis is that gross profits are sufficient to avoid bankruptcy: Assumption 1.s ( q , t) > R for all q E [0,11 and t E {i, t ) .
We simplify some of our characterization results by imposing two additional regularity conditions on r ( q , t). The first is that, given firm B's belief, firm A prefers that its type be t:.
In many familiar models this is merely a definition of the types _t and?. The second condition is that firm A's profit is monotone in firm B's belief: Assumption 3. ~( q , t) is strictly monotone in q. Two cases are possible: (a) T, < 0 and ( b ) Tq > 0.
One or the other of these two cases holds in most applications.
Our main result does not depend on Assumptions 2 or 3; see Propositions 1 and 2. Instead, the result is driven by a feature of product-market competition that we characterize in the two examples below.
Example I. Consider an industry with an inverse-demand function given by where Q is industry supply. We consider a Cournot duopoly, consisting of one firm, labelled A , that knows the value of the demand intercept, a , and another, labelled B, that initially believes that a = i with probability 0 E (0, 1) and a = a with probability 1 -0, where i > a . Costs are assumed to be zero.
We now compute several profit levels for the informed firm, A, that arise in the analysis below. These profit levels correspond to different beliefs held by firm B. If, for instance, the value of the intercept, a , were common knowledge, then both firms would produce a / 3 and earn profit (~1 3 )~.
((a/3)2 and E' (g13)~, the profit to We therefore define ii" = firm A when it is common knowledge that a = i and a = a , respectively. We use the superscript s to denote that this information structure arises when firm B observes the result of a separating equilibrium of the game between firm A and the capital market.
When firm B holds the prior belief that a = a with probability 0, the firms play a when a = a and a = i , respectively. We use the superscript p to denote that this information structure arises when firm B observes the result of a pooling equilibrium of the game between firm A and the capital market. Finally, we need to determine firm A's profits when firm B holds mistaken beliefs about the value of the intercept. (These profits never arise in equilibrium, but are relevant off the equilibrium path.) If firm B believes that a = a when in fact a = 5, then firm A's output is ( 2 i + A)/6, and its resulting profit is ii' = [ 2 i + a12/36. Similarly, if firm B believes that a = a when in fact a = a, then firm A's output is (2g -A)/6. We assume that A < 2a (that is, i < 3a) so that this quantity is positive. The associated profit is then -r' = [2a -AI2/36. We use the prime to denote that these profits arise off the equilibrium path.
It is straightforward to show that in this example OiiP
That is, ex ante expected profits to firm A are higher when firm B is uninformed than when firm B is informed. These information structures correspond, respectively, to pooling and separating equilibria in the capital market. This inequality is an important feature of this example.
Our next example shows that this inequality can be reversed, and Section 5 shows that whether this inequality holds or is reversed completely determines the form of equilibrium in our two-audience signalling model. Example 2. Suppose now that firm B is a potential entrant into the industry described in example 1. Naturally, firm B bases its entry decision on its beliefs about the demand intercept. If firm B enters, then Cournot competition ensues, exactly as described above. The fixed cost of entry is FB.Assume that firm B can finance the fixed entry cost with internal funds.
If firm B enters and believes the demand intercept is Z (a), its gross profit is (~7 1 3 )~ ( (~1 3 )~) .
Z with probability 0, its expected gross profit is If firm B enters and believes a = (~/ 3 )~, where a" = 0Z + (1 -0)a. Assume that (~7 1 3 )~ > FB > (~1 3 )~. > (a"13)~ Then if firm B believes that demand is low, it will not enter, while if firm B believes that demand is high or believes that it is high with probability 0, it will enter.
If there is no entry, firm A earns monopoly profits (~1 2 )~ = Z, and (~1 2 )~ when a when a = a. The values iiS, iiP, y,and X' derived in example 1 are the same here, but E~ is now (~~1 2 )~ because firm B does not enter when it believes that and ii' is now (~/ 2 )~, a = a . It is straightforward to show that OiiS + (1 -0 )~' > OiiP + (1 -O)zP if and only if a2> 0A2. As in the previous example, we assume that A < 2a, so that E' > 0. Thus, -a 2> A2/4, SO that 0 < l/4 guarantees that a2> 0A2, as required.
A two-audience signalling model
This section integrates the capital-market signalling described in Section 2 with the product-market competition described in Section 3. The timing of the game is as follows. First, firm A learns its type, t . It is common knowledge that the state is drawn from (2, t ) , with probability 0 E (0, 1) that t = 7. Next, firm A offers the creditor a financing contract, which the creditor either accepts or rejects. If the creditor rejects the contract, then the game ends; if the creditor accepts the contract, then firm B observes the accepted contract, and the two firms play the product-market game of incomplete information described above. In what follows we (loosely) refer to this product-market game of incomplete information as the postcontract subgame.
As in Section 2, we restrict attention to linear contracts, ( a , D). We explain in the Conclusion that, because our model has only two types, restricting attention to linear contracts does not entail any substantive loss of generality in our two-audience signalling model.
In this game a strategy for firm A is a function from its type space into both the contract space and firm A's strategy space for the postcontract ~ubgame.~ A strategy for the creditor is again a function from the contract space into an acceptance decision. Finally, a strategy for firm B is a function from the contract space into firm B's strategy space for the postcontract subgame.
We also need to define beliefs held by the uninformed players after firm A offers the contract ( a , D): let p(a, D) be the creditor's assessment of the probability that t = 7, and let ~( a , D) be the analogous assessment for firm B. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this game is a triple of strategies and a pair of belief functions satisfying two conditions. Condition la. (i) Given its type, the creditor's strategy, and firm B's strategy, firm A's strategy maximizes its expected payoff. (ii) Given a contract offered by firm A, firm B's strategy, and the creditor's belief, the creditor's strategy maximizes its expected payoff. (iii) Given a contract offered by firm A and accepted by the creditor, and given firm B's belief, firm B's strategy maximizes its expected payoff.
Condition 2a.
When possible, the beliefs p(a, D) and q(a, D) are derived from Bayes' rule and the players' strategies.
As discussed in Section 2, we consider a further restriction on equilibrium, based on consistent interpretations of deviations. The definition of a consistent interpretation must be extended slightly because there are now two uninformed players. As before, an interpretation of a deviation is a (nonempty) subset of the type space of firm A . In our two-type model only three interpretations are possible: { i ) , {t), and {i,?). We say that an uninformed player believes an interpretation if his posterior belief after observing the deviation is his prior belief renormalized over the set of types specified in the interpretation. Suppose it is common knowledge that firm B believes a given interpretation. Compute the gross payoff for each type of firm A in the postcontract subgame. Suppose also that the creditor believes the given interpretation. Given an interpretation, the creditor's posterior belief is his prior belief renormalized over the specified subset. Given a posterior belief, sequential rationality determines whether the creditor accepts or rejects the deviation; if the creditor is indifferent, we assume that the deviation is accepted. Thus, given an interpretation of a deviation, each type in the type space can compute its payoff from offering the deviation, and can compare this with its payoff in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in question. A consistent interpretation is a fixed point of the map described above: a type strictly prefers its payoff from offering the deviation to its equilibrium payoff if and only if it is a member of the hypothesized subset of the type space.
Less formally, in a multiaudience signalling game, a deviation with a consistent interpretation has the property that if all the uninformed players believe the interpretation, then the hypothesized types of the informed player have a (strict) incentive to deviate. Thus, we require the creditor's and firm B's beliefs off the equilibrium path to be identical following deviations with consistent interpretations, but not other~ise.~ As in Section 2, only three consistent interpretationsare possible in our two-type model. In this section we refer to them as ?-separating, i-separating, and pooling consistent interpretations. If a deviation has any of these consistent interpretations, the deviation breaks the equilibrium. Thus, a Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium satisfies Conditions la, 2a, and 3a.
Condition 3a. There cannot exist a deviation with a consistent interpretation.
We reiterate that the consistent interpretation mentioned in Condition 3a differs from that mentioned in Condition 3 because the former requires an uninformed player to hold beliefs about what another uninformed player believes.
Analysis
This section characterizes equilibrium in our model. The main result is that the FarrellGrossman-Perry equilibria are of the form (separating or pooling) that maximizes ex ante expected gross profit for firm A . Formally, if o +~+ (1 -0 )~~2 e j i S + (1 -e )~~,
(1) then pooling maximizes ex ante expected profit, while if (1) fails or holds with equality, then separation maximizes ex ante expected profit. (Recall that examples 1 and 2 in Section 3 establish that both cases are possible.) It may be misleading, however, to interpret It is possible for a single deviation to have several different consistent interpretations. In multiaudience signalling games this possibility implies that different uninformed players could believe different consistent interpretations. We avoid this issue by assuming that cheap talk is available to firm A at the contract-offer stage. This allows firm A to select a single consistent interpretation for the creditor and firm B through the use of a credible neologism; see Farre11 ( 1986).
(1) in terms of firm A's ex ante expected profit (i.e., its expected profit before it learns its type): at no stage in the model does firm A exist without knowing its type. Instead, as will become clear below, the expectations in (1) reflect the uninformed creditor's belief about firm A's type.
To prove this result, we begin by establishing a pair of necessary conditions. First, we show that a necessary condition for the existence of a pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium is that ex ante expected profit for firm A is weakly greater under pooling than under separation-that is, that (1) holds. Then we show that a necessary condition for the existence of a separating Farrell-Grossman-Peny equilibrium is that (1) fails or holds with equality.
Consider first a pooling Farrell-Grossman-Peny equilibrium in which both types of firm A offer the contract (a, D). If the creditor earns positive expected profit on this contract, then the deviation (a', D'), with D' slightly less than D, has a pooling consistent interpretation: if both the creditor and firm B believe that both types would offer this deviation, so that p(ar, Dl) = q(ar, D') = 0, then both types indeed choose to deviate. This deviation leaves product-market payoffs unchanged while reducing financing costs for both types. Therefore, the creditor's expected profit is zero in a pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium:
where iiP = B X-t(1 -B)zP.~
We now consider the conditions under which a deviation (a', D') has either a ?-separating or a i-separating consistent interpretation. These conditions establish a necessary condition for a pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium to exist: (1) must hold.
Consider first a deviation (a', D') that has a ?-separating consistent interpretation. This requires:
(5) Inequality ( 3 ) guarantees that the creditor earns nonnegative profit; ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) ensure that only the ?-type firm accepts the new c~n t r a c t .~ To establish the necessary condition, we choose to consider only those deviations in which ( 3 ) holds with equality. Substituting this equation and (2) into (4) yields and substituting the same equalities into (5 ) yields Given a, there exists an a' satisfying (7). (Recall that we do not restrict a' to [0, 11.) Therefore, there exists a deviation with a 7-separatingconsistent interpretation if (6) holds.
Consider next a deviation (a', Dl) that has a i-separating consistent interpretation. This requires:
Our no-bankruptcy assumption (Assumption 1) guarantees that the limited-liability constraints cannot bind in a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium: the creditor accepts the deviation (0, R ) for any belief p, so that the payoff to the deviating type, ~( 7 , s) -R > 0, strictly exceeds the putative equilibrium payoff of zero.
Note that the _t-type's limited-liability constraint does not affect whether ( 5 ) holds because this constraint can at most make the right-hand side zero, while individual rationality ensures that the equilibrium payoff on the left-hand side must be nonnegative. This argument holds throughout the analysis.
These inequalities are analogous to ( 3)-( 5 ). As before, we consider only those deviations in which ( 8 ) holds with equality. Substituting this equation and (2) into (9) yields a0(FP -EP) < ES-EP, (1 1) and substituting the same equalities into (10) yields
(12)
As before, given a, there exists an a' satisfying (12). Therefore, there exists a deviation with a !-separating consistent interpretation if (I I) holds.
These two potential deviations establish that a necessary condition for a pooling FarrellGrossman-Perry equilibrium to exist is that 16) and (1 1) fail: which implies (I). We record this result as Proposition 1. This result does not require Assumptions 2 or 3. Imposing various combinations of these assumptions, however, allows us to interpret the pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibria. Under Assumptions 2 and 3(a), for instance, FP > E~and T~> xP, in which case the second inequality in (13 ) implies that any pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium must have a > 0. In this case (2) implies that the ?-type subsidizes the !-type in the capital market: 2(2) has financing costs greater (less) than R . In the product market, on the other hand, 7 (2) has higher (lower) gross profit when capital-market equilibrium is pooling than when it is separating: FP = .rr(O,?)> Fs = ~( l , 2) > Eĩ ), but E~= ~( 0 , = .rr(O,i) because .rr, < 0. This proves our claim that, given mild regularity conditions, reasonable pooling equilibria must involve countervailing effects in the capital and product markets.
When Assumptions 2 and 3(b) hold, FP > xPand FS > FP, in which case the first inequality in (I 3) implies that any pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium must have a < 0. Now the 2-type subsidizes the ?-type in the capital market, and in the product market -t suffers in a pooling equilibrium. Again, reasonable pooling equilibria involve countervailing effects. Finally, (13) implies that either Assumption 3(a) or 3(b) is sufficient to preclude pooling at debt. In a debt contract both types incur the same financing cost, so that the capital market does not provide the countervailing effect necessary to prevent a separating deviation by one type.
Corollary. If ~( q , t) is strictly monotonic in q, then there cannot exist a pooling FarrellGrossman-Perry equilibrium in which both firms offer a debt contract, (0, D).
This result is in stark contrast to the analogous result in Section 2: when the analysis ignores competition in the product market, so that firm A's gross profits are exogenous, the only pooling equilibrium is the zero-profit debt contract (0, R).
We now consider a separating Farrell-Grossman-Peny equilibrium { (g, D) , ( G , D)}.
It must satisfy the following incentive-compatibility conditions:
In this notation (g, B ) is the contract offered by firm A when t = 1, and (5, D ) is offered when t = ?. These contracts must yield nonnegative profits for the creditor:
Consider a deviation ( a ' ,D') that has a pooling consistent interpretation. This requires: (18) ( 1 -a ' ) ( x P-D')> ( 1 -g ) ( 7 y -D) . ( 
19)
We consider only deviations that earn zero expected profit for the creditor:
where .iiP= 8iiP+ ( 1 -8) ?rP, as above. Substituting ( 2 0 )into ( 1 8 )and ( 1 9 
)yields
Thus, there exists a pooling consistent deviation if ( 21 ) holds. This establishes that a necessary condition for a separating Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium to exist is that the left-hand side of (21)weakly exceed the right-hand side. After applying ( 1 6 )and ( l 7 ) ,we have Hence, we have established that a necessary condition for a separating Farrell-GrossmanPerry equilibrium to exist is that ( I ) must fail or hold with equality. We record this result as Proposition 2. Proposition 2. A necessary condition for the existence of a separating Farrell-GrossmanPerry equilibrium is that ex ante expected profit for finnA is weakly greater under separation than under pooling:
Propositions 1 and 2 establish necessary conditions for the existence of pooling and separatingFanell-Grossman-Perry equilibria. In the Appendix we prove the following characterization results.
Proposition 3. Given Assumptions 2 and 3, the contract ( a ,D) can be supported as a pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perryequilibrium if and only if ( 1 ) holds, the zero-profit condition ( 2 ) holds, and a satisfies (1 3) . Given Assumptions2 and 3, the contracts ( g ,D ) and (G,b )can be supported as a separating Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium if and only if ( 1 ) fails or holds with equality, the nonnegative profit constraints ( 1 6 )and ( 1 7 )hold with equality, and
Proposition 4.
We can relate ( 2 3 )and ( 2 4 ) to Myers and Majluf's (1984) intuition that low-profit firms issue more equity. If ~( q ,
then adding the incentive-compatibilityconstraints (14)and ( 1 5 )implies that g > a! in all separating equilibria.
Conclusion
Although two-audience signalling models of the type analyzed here have received little attention in the literature, they have a rich collection of potential applications. First, the gross profit function ~( q , t) introduced in Section 3 is general enough that the second uninformed audience in our model can be reinterpreted (without any changes in the model) as a labor union or a regulator rather than a product-market competitor. Second, models of product-market signalling, such as the limit-pricing model analyzed by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) , could be enriched to include a second audience, such as the capital market. See Dewatripont (1986) for an analysis of Milgrom and Roberts' game in which a labor union is a second audience.
The rest of this Conclusion considers some of the issues raised but incompletely treated in the body of the article. We discuss, in turn, game-theoretic modelling issues (including our choice of a refinement concept), other modelling issues (including our focus on linear financing contracts), and various possible extensions of the analysis (including a model of an initial public offering).
Game-theoretic modelling issues. We have modelled information transmission as a signalling game: the informed player moves before the uninformed players move. In this setting our main result follows from the refinement concept we impose on equilibrium in the signalling game. This subsection considers three modifications of our model: (1) alternative refinement concepts in signalling games, (2) alternative strategy spaces in signalling games, and (3) alternative games of information transmission, in which an uninformed player moves first.
The refinement we impose, that no deviation has a consistent interpretation, involves a strong restriction on beliefs off the equilibrium path. As mentioned in Section 2, Cho and Kreps (1987) propose a weaker restriction: out-of-equilibrium beliefs should put no weight on types that have no incentive to deviate no matter what the creditor believes about the set of types that deviated. The weaker Cho and Kreps refinement has an interesting effect in our model: Proposition 1 continues to hold, but Proposition 2 does not.
Recall that Proposition 1 rules out putative pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibria by demonstrating the existence of either a ?-separating or a !-separating consistent interpretation of a deviation. Given the existence of a deviation (a', D') with a separating consistent interpretation, there exists an analogous deviation (a", D") that satisfies the stronger Cho and Kreps (1987)test: no matter what the uninformed players infer from the deviation (a", D"), one type (say, 2) has no incentive to offer such a deviation, so that the uninformed infer that? offered the deviation, and this induces 7 to deviate. Proposition 2, however, rules out putative separating Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibria by demonstrating the existence of a pooling consistent interpretation of a deviation. The essence of this pooling consistent interpretation is that both types prefer to deviate, and hence it seems natural that the belief off the equilibrium path should be the prior belief, as is the case under Farrell-GrossmanPeny refinement. Cho and Kreps' refinement, however, has force only when some types certainly would not deviate, so that it cannot speak to such pooling deviations.
We turn next to a signalling game with a richer strategy space. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the informed firm A offers the uninformed creditor a menu of financing contracts. Second, the creditor chooses either to accept or to reject the menu. Third, if the creditor accepts the menu, then firm A chooses a contract from the menu, and this chosen contract is observed by the uninformed firm B. (If the creditor rejects the menu, then the game ends and payoffs are zero.) Fourth, firms A and B play the product-market game of incomplete information described in Section 3.
This timing is implicit in Myerson (1983) . The richer strategy space introduces the possibility of cross-subsidizing separating equilibria. In such an equilibrium the two types of firm A propose identical menus consisting of a pair of contracts. The creditor earns zero expected profit on the menu and so accepts it. Finally, the different types of firm A choose different contracts from the menu. Thus, from the perspective of firm B, this is a separating equilibrium. It is important that the separation occur after the creditor accepts the menu, however, because one of the contracts may lose money for the creditor ex post. Such cross subsidization cannot occur in the model we analyze because separation occurs before the creditor accepts firm A's proposed contract. Miyazaki (1977) first explained how cross-subsidizing separating deviations can destroy putative pooling equilibria even when non-cross-subsidizing separating deviations cannot. The key idea is that the cross-subsidizingseparating deviation might attract both types from the putative pooling equilibrium. In our model, however, pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibria involve zero expected profit for the creditor and exist only if the ex ante expected gross profit to firm A is higher under pooling than under separation. Therefore, a crosssubsidizing separating deviation could not attract both types of firm A .
Finally, we consider an alternative game of information transmission in which an uninformed player moves first. This timing mimics Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) and Wilson's (1977) models of insurance markets. In a pure capital-market model, like that in Section 2, the timing is: each of two competing creditors simultaneously offers a set of financing contracts to the informed firm; the informed firm then accepts at most one of the offered contracts.
It is straightfornard to show that the subgame-perfect equilibrium contracts accepted in this Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson game are exactly those accepted in equilibria that survive the Farrell-Grossman-Perry refinement in the signalling game in Section 2 (and therefore, by our results in that section, exactly those accepted in perfect Bayesian equilibria of the signalling game). This result is closely related to recent work in more general settings on the relationship between competitive equilibria in Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson games and equilibria that survive refinements in analogous signalling games.6
The Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson analogue of the model we analyze in Sections 4 and 5 is complicated by the presence of the uninformed firm B. The timing we have in mind is that firm B observes the outcome of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson game described above, and then firms A and B play the postcontract subgame described in Section 3. Thus, the entire game comprises: first, a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson stage involving the creditors and firm A; and second, a signalling stage involving firm A and firm B, in which the set of signalsfirm A can send is endogenouslydetermined by the creditors' moves in the RothschildStiglitz-Wilson stage. As in all signalling games, the uninformed firm B's out-of-equilibrium beliefs substantially affect the character of equilibrium. Thus, despite the apparent power of the RothschildStiglitz-Wilsontiming of the first stage, it turns out that the signalling timing of the second stage makes it necessary to apply a refinement concept to eliminate implausible equilibria.
Other modelling issues. Our analysis assumes that any linear financing contract is feasible. Of course, equity components (a) outside [0, 11 and debt components (D) less than zero seem rare in the world. A preliminary analysis suggests that requiring that a E [0, 11 and that D 2 0 considerably complicates the results. For instance, a pooling equilibrium may not exist when the capital-market payoffs are small relative to the product-market payoffs (i.e., R is small relative to ~( q , t)). A loose statement of the intuition is as follows. Consider a pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium under Assumption 3 ( a) : ( 13 ) requires that a 2 ( x S-xp)/ [0(iiP-?yP)], which is strictly positive; the zero-profit constraint, on the other hand, requires that D = (R -a.iip)/(l -a),which may be negative if R is Madrigal and Tan (1986) , for instance, show that $a competitive equilibrium outcome in a RothschildStiglitz-Wilsongame can be supported (by appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs) as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the analogous signalling game, then it can be supported as a Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium in the signalling game. Stiglitz and Weiss (1986) provide conditions that guarantee that a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson equilibrium outcome can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the analogous signalling game. small relative to .iip and a is large. This intuition is loose because the deviations considered in the derivation of (13) allow a outside [0, 11 and D < 0. In fact, pooling equilibria can exist in the model with a restricted contract space even when R is arbitrarily small, provided a condition like the sorting condition familiar from one-audience signalling models holds. Independent of whether pooling equilibria exist, pooling deviations that break putative separating equilibria may still exist. Under certain conditions no equilibrium exists in the model with a restricted contract space. As is well known, similar nonexistence results arise in the original applications of the Farrell-Grossman-Perry refinement, as well as in some versions of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson game.
In one sense, then, our feasible set of financing contracts is excessively large. In another sense, however, the set of linear contracts we consider may seem excessively small: nonlinear contracts, such as step functions, can be important in models that involve a moving support (i.e., some profit levels that are feasible for one type are infeasible for another). In our twotype model, however, our main result would be unchanged if we considered such nonlinear contracts. This point is clear in the simple model in Section 2 but also true in the twoaudience model in Sections 4 and 5, because of a combination of three arguments. First, the set of payoffs to perfect Bayesian equilibria in our model (weakly) includes the set of payoffs to perfect Bayesian equilibria in the analogous model with general contracts. Second, if a general contract is a deviation with a consistent interpretation, then there exists a linear contract that is a deviation with the same consistent interpretation. (These two arguments imply that the set of payoffs to Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibria in our model (weakly) includes the set of payoffs to such equilibria in the analogous model with general contracts.) Third, our main result takes the form of necessary conditions; see Proposition 1, its Corollary, and Proposition 2. Together, these arguments imply that our main result holds for the model with general contracts. This argument depends, of course, on the fact that there are only two types in the model. Extensions. Our model assumes that firm A's capital structure is observed by the uninformed firm B. This is appropriate if firm A is a public corporation. If firm A is not publicly traded, however, then it may be able to conceal its financial structure from productmarket competitors. Two interesting possibilities arise in this setting. First, while there are no disclosure requirements for a privately held firm, such a firm can choose to reveal its capital structure to product-market competitors, and this choice may act as a signal. Second, the firm may have a choice about whether to be private, and this choice may also be a signal, especially if the cost of capital differs for publicly and privately held firms. A further consequence of going public is that disclosure laws mandate that information other than capital structure be revealed.
Our model also assumes that there is no bankruptcy and that there is no ex post uncertainty about firm A's profit. In a model without product-market effects, Gertner (1986) shows that limited liability and ex post uncertainty can combine to make pooling at (risky) debt an equilibrium. In such an equilibrium high-profit firms subsidize low-profit firms in the capital market, because the latter face a higher probability of bankruptcy. In a pooling Farrell-Grossman-Perry equilibrium in our model, we need subsidization in the capital market to balance the effects of the product market. In particular, under Assumption 3(a) a positive equity component ( a > 0 ) is required to achieve this balance, and it does so by forcing the high-profit firm to subsidize the low-profit firm in the capital market. The subsidization in Gertner's (1986) model suggests that a pure-debt contract could achieve this balance in our model if debt were risky. (A91 Note that if a ' r 0, then (A6) and Assumption 2 imply that the right-hand sides of (A8) and (A9) are nonpositive. Similarly, if a ' < 0, then (A7) and Assumption 2 imply that these quantities are nonpositive. Thus, it suffices to show that:
We now consider the two cases, Assumptions 3(a) and 3(b), given in (i) and (ii). First, suppose that Assumption 3(a) holds. Set q = 1. Suppose that a r 0. Then (A1 1) clearly holds, and (A10) yields the first inequality in (Al). Now suppose that a < 0. Then (AlO) clearly holds, and (A1 1) yields the second inequality in (Al). Now suppose that Assumption 3(b) holds. Set q = 0. Suppose that a 2 0. Then (A1 1) clearly holds, and (A10) yields the first inequality in (A2). Now suppose that a < 0. Then (AlO) clearly holds, and (A1 1) yields the second inequality in (A2). Q.E.D. (ii) Deviations with 7-separating or !-separating consistent interpretations share the property that the information conveyed to firm B by the deviation is the same as the information conveyed by the putative equilibrium. Thus, product-market profits to the type in question do not change. Because (16) and (17) hold with equality, there is no scope for more attractive financing terms. These two observations together imply that deviations with such consistent interpretations do not exist.
(iii) It remains to show that there do not exist deviations with a pooling consistent interpretation that earn strictly positive expected profit for the creditor. The argument is simple: if (a', D') is such a positive-profit deviation, then there exists a zero-profit deviation with a pooling consistent interpretation, because the firm can reduce the financing cost a'iiP + (1 -a1)D' to R by reducing (I -a1)D' while holding a ' constant, and the creditor still will accept. Q.E.D.
